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CONTRADICTION AND RECURSION IN 
BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY: 
FROM CATUṢKOṬI TO KŌAN
Introduction
Everything is real and is not real,  A Monk asked:
Both real and not real,  “What is Buddha?”
Neither real nor not real.  The Zen Teacher answered:
This is Lord Buddha’s teaching.  “Three pounds of flax”
MMK (18:8)     Wúmén Guān: (18)
Prima facie, MMK (18:8) on the left, and Wúmén Guān (18) 
(Ch. 無門關) on the right don’t have a lot in common—but they 
do.1 Both are, and this is the main hypothesis of this essay, a 
schema for upāya (Skt. उपाय): skilful means of teaching the path 
to enlightenment.
Wúmén Guān: (18) is a Kōan (Ch. 公案), which features 
predominantly in the Chinese Chan and the Japanese Zen 
tradition. The focus of §4 will be on the Kōan.
The subsequent section, §2, will be concerned with the 
argument from MMK (18:8) above which goes under the name 
catuṣkoṭi (Skt. चतुष्कोटि), which literally means “four corners.” In 
its simplest from, the catuṣkoti is the view that any claim can be 
true, false, both true and false or neither true nor false. Those 
are, metaphorically, the four corners (kotis). The origins of the 
catuṣkoṭi and the origin of Buddhism are concomitant. In fact, as 
1 I am indebted to the audience at the Asian Philosophical Texts conference 
at the Centre for East Asian Studies (EASt), Université Libre de Bruxelles 
in November 2018. Special thanks go to Takeshi Morisato. Furthermore, I 
would like to express my gratitude for helpful comments by two anonymous 
referees which have improved the quality of this essay and also to Jan 
Westerhoff for a translational remark.
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Ruegg (1977) holds, we recognize (parts of the catuṣkoṭi) in the 
earliest sutras, in the intellectual circles of the historical Buddha 
Gautama, as in the Māluṅkyaputta Sutta, for instance. As this 
teaching has its origin in Brahmanism (or the rejection thereof), 
it is only sensible to anticipate the earliest manifestations of 
the catuṣkoṭi in Brahmanical texts. Yet, although the fourth 
koti features in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad and the third koti 
can be found in the Samavayanga Sutra, they have never been 
endorsed together. So, the catuṣkoṭi seems to be a genuinely 
Buddhist concept. Clearly, it has found its most prominent 
use in the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism and the writings 
of Nāgārjuna2, and his Mu ̄lamadhyamakakārikā (henceforth: 
MMK) and commentaries thereon. I shall focus the discussion 
on Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi.
Taking the Buddhist worldview into perspective, it is not 
surprising that metaphysical, epistemological and logical notions 
(such as the two instances above) have a practical import. At least 
for the practicing Buddhist, any philosophical concept should 
be tried in practice to decide whether it is (or not) an expedient 
means towards enlightenment—i.e. upāya3.
Here, again, is my main hypothesis: catuṣkoṭi and Kōan 
have the same function in Buddhist philosophy, Madhyamaka 
and Zen respectively, and share a systematic structure. Both 
are to be considered a schema for upāya—means towards the 
soteriological “end-goal,” which is enlightenment.
Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi
A lot of ink has been spilled on the catuṣkoṭi in the philosophical 
academic literature, compared to its (in)-significance to the Euro- 
and Anglo centrism of Western academic philosophy of the last 
centuries. David Ruegg (1977) once said: “The doctrine (the 
catuṣkoṭi) has been described as nihilism, monism, irrationalism, 
2 See Jan Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka. A Philosophical Introduction. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
3 As described in the Lotus Sutra.
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misology, agnosticism, scepticism, criticism, dialectic, 
mysticism, acosmism, absolutism, relativism, nominalism, 
and linguistic analysis with therapeutic value.”  And we can 
add deconstructivism, and what we will be concerned with, 
dialetheism and ontological non-foundationalism, to the list. It 
is the aim of this essay to contribute to the ongoing endeavour 
to make sense of this seemingly mysterious logical schema. 
Whether it adds just another interpretation, and the mystery 
remains, I cannot judge. Also, this essay will seriously question 
whether it, at all, makes sense to make sense of the catuṣkoṭi. 
This, however, is a vexed question: isn’t judging something not 
to make sense, in the end, making sense of it? I shall not attempt 
to grapple with the overarching question here, although I shall 
allow myself a standpoint on whether there is sense to be found 
in the catuṣkoṭi in the conclusion.
A Set of Open Questions on the Catuṣkoṭi
Although a lot has been said about the catuṣkoṭi, there is as yet 
no comprehensive answer to the following questions:
(1) What is the catuṣkoṭi, and what role does it play in Buddhist 
philosophy?
(2) What (if there is one) is the logical from of the catuṣkoṭi?
(3) What is the catuṣkoṭi’s historical position in the wider 
history of Buddhist philosophy?
In fact, I believe myself to have discovered a possible source 
for the controversy around the catuṣkoṭi in Western commentarial 
literature: The constant nullification of efforts in making sense of 
the catuṣkoṭi was to be anticipated for two reasons (other than the 
usual suspicion of Eastern thoughts being mystical, incoherent 
and unsystematic4):
4 For this reason, it is important to show with the tools of contemporary 
formalisms that those Eastern thoughts perfectly stand to reason. We can 
thereby contribute to an alleviation of those misconceptions.
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(i) Questions 1–3, if they have been addressed at all, have 
been addressed in (nearly complete) isolation. Furthermore, 
Western academic research has primarily been concerned with 
it is the second question. Hence, we see a “logic-first” approach 
in the research literature on the catuṣkoṭi. It is, then, no surprise 
that the catuṣkoṭi has been considered perplexing, mysterious 
and incoherent—it does not fare well with Classical Logic, as 
the remainder of this section is set to demonstrate. Not only 
in Buddhist philosophy, but in philosophy tout court, it is the 
metaphysics which plays significantly into the logic. Therefore, 
avoiding the metaphysics and purely focusing on the logic is 
dangerous. The catuṣkoṭi, for unknown reasons, as for the most 
part been detached from its metaphysical surrounding and has 
been considered and treated as exclusively a piece a logic—
Priest/Garfield (2010) might be an exception here.
(ii) The recent literature almost exclusively focuses on 
Nāgārjuna ‘s Madhyamaka, and the use of the catuṣkoṭi therein. 
Sure, I do too, but merely to take Nāgārjuna as the starting point. 
The catuṣkoṭi didn’t suddenly appear in Buddhist philosophy 
with Nāgārjuna, just to disappear again. My hypothesis is that 
the catuskoti appears in various forms throughout Buddhist 
thought and not solely in Madhyamaka. I propose that we widen 
our horizons and look beyond Nāgārjuna.
To give you an (albeit old, but relevant) example of what 
the research literature is addressing, one of the most influential 
papers on the subject5 is states the following:
It is thus important to examine (1) how it was that Nagarjuna came 
to make such extensive use of the catuṣkoṭi; (2) the logical form of 
Nagarjuna’s catuṣkoṭi; and (3) with that purpose and in what manner 
this “logical apparatus” was handled by Nagarjuna in exposition of his 
philosophy.6
5 Although the philosophical environment in which the catuṣkoṭi came up is 
mentioned in question (3), it has not been taken into account when answering 
question (2)—this is characteristic of the “logic-first” approach to the 
catuṣkoṭi: a misguided approach.
6 Ranil Dion Gunaratne, The logical form of the catuṣkoṭi: A new solution 
(Philosophy East & West, 1980), 214.
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In the same paper, we find—and this, for many reasons, is 
astonishing—two further positions on how to see the catuṣkoṭi 
which the author considers necessary to get “the overall picture.”
(D) The catuṣkoṭi was used by him (AK: Nāgārjuna) as a dialectic 
which progressively leads one to truth. (E). The catuṣkoṭi was used as 
an instrument of meditation. It is clear that these positions need not be 
mutually exclusive. Limitations of space prevent any consideration of (D) 
and (E) here, although I think that both of these are possible interpretations 
of Nāgārjuna’s use of catuṣkoṭi and the consideration of them is necessary 
to get the overall picture of Nāgārjuna a’s effort in the (MMK).7 
It is exactly positions (D) and (E) that I want to advocate in 
this essay. I find it peculiar how the Gunaratne came up with 
these positions, as there is, as far as I am aware, no trace of 
it in Nāgārjuna’s corpus. It is even more surprising why the 
author, being unsatisfied with the (hitherto) noncomprehensive 
treatments of the catuṣkoṭi did not continue research on those 
two possibilities, already guessing them to be indispensable for 
the attaining of a cohesive concept. The decision to disregard 
the ontological, soteriological and historical framework has 
(unsurprisingly) led to an unrewarding treatment of the catuṣkoṭi, 
detached from its philosophical context8. This essay is supposed 
to take up Gunaratne’s legacy. 
It is, perhaps for those two reasons, given above, that Tillemans 
(1999,189) held that “within Buddhist thought, the structure of 
argumentation that seems most resistant to our attempts at a 
formalization is undoubtedly the catuṣkoṭi“—a thought which 
stretches back to Poussin’s (1917) paper (probably the earliest 
philosophical treatment of the catuṣkoṭi in the West) and 
manifested its position as the “Buddhist dilemma.” 
Why a dilemma? In fact, if at all, the catuṣkoṭi is a tetralemma 
as it has four positions as opposed to two. Why the catuṣkoṭi 
7 Ranil Dion Gunaratne, 215.
8 As a metaphysical example, try examining the natural behaviour of a dolphin 
in a swimming pool where it is not surprising that the results of the study 
will not be true to the studied object (we cannot expect the dolphin to behave 
naturally in captivity). We need to put the dolphin back to the ocean to study 
its natural behaviour.
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is posing a tetralemma becomes apparent through logical 
formalization. This is what I shall turn to now. 
The Logic of the Catuṣkoṭi
The reason why the catuṣkoṭi is considered resistant to 
formalization is the following: in Western orthodoxy9, we 
encounter the principle of tertium non datur: everything is either 
true, or false—c’est tout. The catuṣkoṭi inflates (while denying) 
this principle to a quintum non datur: It sates four exhaustive 
and mutually exclusive possibilities for any proposition: (1) 
either it holds, (2) it does not hold, (3) it both holds and does not 
hold, (4) it neither holds nor does not hold—those are the four 
kotis (corners). It seems (but it is not) easy to spell out the basic 
schema of the catuṣkoṭi in classical Boolean terms. Here is a first 
(bad) try. Let “everything” from our example in MMK (18:8) 
be expressed by ‘A’. The four corners of the catuṣkoṭi become 
visible before our eyes:
Positive catuṣkoṭi
(1)     A
(2)     ¬A
(3)     A∧¬A
(4)     ¬(A∨¬A)
A (formal) model for the catuṣkoṭi has to maintain the mutual 
exclusivity and exhaustive nature of the kotis. The reason for the 
exhaustivity, other than wanting to be charitable to the coherence 
and logical abilities of the authors who have employed the 
catuṣkoṭi, lies in the way the (negative) catuṣkoṭi, 
9 As well as classical Indian Nyaya thought, by the way.
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Negative catuṣkoṭi
(1)     ¬A
(2)     ¬¬A
(3)     ¬(A∧¬A)
(4)     ¬¬(A∨¬A)
which denies all four possibilities, is commonly employed 
as an argument that is supposed to undermine all possible ways 
a predicate can be attributed to something—a kind of reductio 
argument to reveal the deficiency of the concept in question. 
Ma ̄dhyamikas have called this method prasaṅga. The concepts 
the MMK is dealing with are causation, motion, self, identity 
and others. In MMK (18:8), specifically, the thesis is that 
everything is real. The four kotis are supposed to exhaust all of 
the logical space and to mention every possible way “reality” 
can be attributed to the object which is “everything.” Hence, 
the argument sees the anti-thesis that ‘everything’ is not real, 
the conjunction of thesis and anti-thesis, and the disjunction 
of thesis and anti-thesis. A denial (as in the negative catuṣkoṭi) 
of every possible way in which “realness” can be attributed to 
“everything” is then a prasaṅga-argument against the possibility 
of ascribing “realness” to “everything.” 
The conclusion the Mādhyamikas drew from this is that 
nothing is “real.” While this alone might sound mystic to the 
Western philosopher, it should become comprehensible as a 
philosophical argument once the metaphysical fundament on 
which it is based is made explicit. Consider Priest (2010) here: 
The central concern of the MMK is to establish that everything is empty 
of self-existence (svabhāva), and the ramifications of this fact. The main 
part of the work consists of a series of chapters which aim to establish, of 
all the things which one might plausibly take to have svabhāva (causes, the 
self, suffering, etc.), that they do not do so.10
10 Graham Priest, The Logic of the Catuṣkoṭi (Comparative Philosophy, 2010): 
12.
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To do what Priest describes, every possible way something 
can be has to be ruled out eventually, to illuminate its emptiness 
of self-existence (lack of svabhāva)—this is what is meant by 
saying that something is not “real” in a Buddhist context: is 
lacks self-existence. The quadruple-wise exclusivity, i.e. that 
none of the kotis expresses something that one of the other kotis 
already expresses, comes as a natural consequence of wanting 
to establish the exhaustivity of the kotis. Only if none of the 
kotis is equivalent to any of the other kotis; and only if each 
koti establishes a distinct possibility, can the logical space can 
be exhausted, and the catuṣkoṭi used as a prasaṅga–argument. 
Evaluation of the Proposed Formalization
That the catuṣkoṭi, as formulated above, does not go hand in 
hand with classical logic is no surprise. In fact, it collapses in a 
classical framework: (4) is equivalent to (3) by De Morgan, and 
(3) entails both (2) and (1). Priest (2010) convincingly refutes a 
number of influential attempts to capture the spirit of the catuṣkoṭi 
in a bivalent framework and puts forward his formalization of the 
catuṣkoṭi in (plurivalent) First-Degree-Entailment which allows 
for things to be both true and false, and neither true not false—
just what koti three and koti four are saying. This is not the point 
to go into the logic, but it is (nearly) undeniable that once the Law 
of Non-Contradiction and Explosion are given up, the mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive nature on the kotis can be preserved.11 
One formality which is going to be crucial for a thorough 
11 Unfortunately, the framework has a problem on its own, which, in the 
modern debate on non-classical logic, is known as the Recapture Problem. 
The paraconsitent logic in which the catuṣkoṭi is formulated makes classical 
principles such as modus ponens invalid, but in certain situations those 
classical inferences are taken to be valid. (this is the classical Recapture 
Problem). The MMK might be such a situation, where Nāgārjuna, on the 
one hand, is using the catuṣkoṭi in the paraconsitent and paracomplete 
framework, but is on the other hand using classical inferences such as modus 
ponens, hence, Nāgārjuna is facing a Recapture Problem. For a detailed 
analysis of the logic and a proposed solution to the problem, see Adrian 
Kreutz, Recapture, Transparency, Negation and a Logic for the catuṣkoṭi 
(Comparative Philosophy, 2019): 8.
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understanding of the subsequent discussion is the notion of a 
status-predicate, which is a meta-linguistic tool to express the 
alethic status of a truth carrier. 
In the search for an adequate model for the (Nāgārjuna’s) 
catuṣkoṭi Priest (2010) expresses the four kotis with the following 
set of status-predicates: S={T, F, B, N}. Let T be the truth-
predicate “is true,” F is “is false,” B is “both true and false,” N 
is “neither true nor false.” T(A) is the proposition “A is true,” 
where (A) is a name for A To define B, N Priest first defines F as 
F(A)= T(¬A). Here is how we define the four kotis.




Bear in mind that koti three and koti four are genuine 
possibilities in the logic Priest is using, although they surely 
appear paradoxical, they are not—in fact, what (partly) 
motivated the development of those logics was the quest to deal 
with paradoxes, such as the liar paradox. The catuṣkoṭi can now 
be expressed in the following way: 
Catuskoti:T(A)∨F(A)∨B(A)∨N(A)
Can I, at this point, already motivate my main hypothesis, that 
the catuṣkoṭi is an instance of upāya?12 There are clear indications 
in both Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti which prompt the suspicion 
that both were seeing a connection between the study of reality 
from several perspectives (perhaps the catuṣkoṭi) and a change 
in attitude of soteriological/psychological importance (perhaps 
enlightenment). Consider the final verse of the MMK (27.30), 
for example, which claims that the purpose of Buddhist teaching 
is the abandonment of all views—which is what the negative 
catuṣkoṭi announces. Also, there is Candrakīrit’s metaphor of 
12 Thanks go out to an anonymous referee for making me aware of this.
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a purgative drug in his commentary on MMK (13.8), where 
emptiness is compared to a drug that purges other things before 
purging itself as well. Also, we find the point that a prasaṅga 
argument is always in a dialectical context in opposition to 
another view (it is upāya applied to philosophical argumentation 
as it were). Are these considerations decisive? I am not sure. I 
shall therefore leave the realms of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism and 
follow the development of the catuṣkoṭi further to the East. 
Things will become clearer there, yet also somewhat cryptic.
Going Beyond Nāgārjuna
We have familiarized ourselves with Nāgārjuna and shall skip 
the epoch of his commentator’s and arrive in China (500AD), 
where Madhyamaka Buddhism and Daoism merged into one.13 It 
is here that the role of the catuṣkoṭi as upāya becomes perspicuous. 
The school of Sānlùn (Ch.三論宗), which translates as “Three 
Treatises”14, absorbed Madhyamaka philosophy and with it the 
catuṣkoṭi. In Jízàng’s (Ch: 吉藏) Erdi Zhang (Ch. 二諦章) we 
can rediscover the catuṣkoṭi, albeit in a modified form.15
The Erdi Zhang
With this framework at hand, let us now turn to the role of the 
catuṣkoṭi in Jízàng’s “Erdi Zhang” (Ch. 二諦章; Eng. “Essay 
on the Two Levels of Truth”), which commences with:
13 See Wing-Tsit Chan, A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy. (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University, 1963), 360.
14 The “three treatises” from which the Chinese version of Madhyamaka took 
its name are: Mūlamādhyamakakārikā—Zhōnglùn (Ch. 中論), Nāgārjuna’s 
Dva ̄daśanikāyaśāstra—Shíèrménlùn (Ch. 十二門論) and Āryadeva’s 
Śatakaśāstra—Băilùn (Ch. 百論). It later came to Japan under the name 
Sanron, but disappeared during the Nara period, or was most probably 
absorbed into Shingon.
15 Shortly after this paper has been given at the APT Conference, Priest 
(2018,7) also published on the hierarchy of truth-values and expressed it with 
a recursive model. He is not, however, drawing the same conclusions from it 
as I do, as will be explicit in §3.3 and §3.4. 
A. Kreutz - Contradiction and Recursion in Buddhist Philosophy 143
The three kinds of ‘Two Levels of Truth’ all represent the principle 
of gradual rejection, like building a framework from the ground. Why? 
Ordinary people say that dharmas, as a matter of true record, possess 
being, without realizing that they possess nothing. Therefore, the Buddha 
propounded to them the doctrine that dharmas are ultimately empty and 
void.16 
What Jízàng describes in this opening paragraph of his most 
influential text is a hierarchy of truth-levels, built from the 
“ordinary people’s” idea that dharmas possess being (i.e., in 
Madhyamaka vocabulary, that things have svabhāva). In line 
with Madhyamaka thought he holds instead that no dharma (i.e. 
no phenomenon, may it be physical or psychological) possesses 
being (i.e. everything is devoid of svabhāva), and only emptiness 
(i.e. sunyata) is to be ascribed to all dharmas—nothing has 
(intrinsic) self-being, everything is empty. We can read the 
“ordinary people’s” view that dharmas have self-being, taking 
the status-predicates into account, as T(B), and so we have the 
first koti. Its negation, therefore, is the Buddha’s doctrine that 
dharmas are ultimately empty and void—¬T(B)17—which is our 
second koti. 
Jízàng’s following analysis then, sustaining the thought 
that what is described here are the corners of the catuṣkoṭi, 
supports the hypothesis that the catuṣkoṭi’s position in Buddhist 
philosophy is upāya (skilful means).
When it is said that dharmas possess being, it is ordinary people who 
say so. This is worldly truth, the truth of ordinary people. Saints and sages, 
however, truly know that dharmas are empty of nature. This is absolute 
truth, the truth of sages. The principle is taught in order to enable people 
to advance from the worldly to the absolute, and to renounce the truth of 
16 ibid. 360.
17 Which is equivalent to F(B), i.e. the ultimate falsehood that B (that dharmas 
have self-being). Which is equivalent to the ultimate truth T(¬B), i.e. 
that ultimate truth that dharmas have no self-being. As we will see later, 
formulating the ideas of Jízàng with the status-predicate T (and its negation) 
only avoids confusion.
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ordinary people and to accept that of sages. This is the reason for clarifying 
the first level of twofold truth.18 
We can interpret Jízàng as saying that it is an ordinary truth 
that dharmas have being—T(B)—but it’s the absolute truth 
that they don’t (i.e. a falsehood that they do), i.e. ¬T(B). Still 
being on the first level of twofold-truth (there are many more to 
follow), let me construct a diagram that depicts the metaphysical 
hierarchy of levels of truth.19
1st Level of Truth T(B) ¬T(B)
Ordinary Truth Absolute Truth
The highlighted part in the quote above is, I guess obviously, 
referring to upāya, which, in this case, consist in the negation of 
ordinary belief. The negation of the ordinary belief that dharma’s 
have being, we can stipulate, is the first step on the path towards 
enlightenment. Jízàng’s essay continues:
Next comes the second stage, which explains that both being 
and non-being belong to worldly truth, whereas non-duality 
(neither being nor non-being) belongs to absolute truth. It 
shows that being and non-being are two extremes, being the one 
and non-being the other. From these to permanence and non-
permanence, and the cycle of life and death and Nirvana are 
both two extremes, they therefore constitute worldly truth, and 
because neither-the- absolute-nor-the-worldly, and neither-the-
cycle-of-life-and-death, nor Nirvana are the Middle Path without 
duality, they constitute the highest truth.20 
We are being told that T(B) and ¬T(B) are merely worldly truth, this 
is, something that “ordinary people” would hold—which is no surprise, 
18 Ibid. 360, emphasis added.
19 In Nāgārjuna’s words, Jízàng describes “a truth of mundane conventions 
(saṁvṛti-satya) and a truth of the ultimate (paramārtha-satya)” as in 
Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka, 2.
20 Ibid. 360
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as both propositions are expressed in language, and language is usually 
considered to be an aspect of the ordinary realm. Speaking of realms 
here; whence the compartmentalization of reality into different realms? 
Madhyamaka Buddhism distinguishes between conventional (ordinary) 
reality, which is the realm of language, thought, and the (from the ultimate 
perspective) erroneous view that things have own-being, and ultimate 
reality in which nothing has own-being and language and thought lack their 
descriptive power. Ordinary truth, then, are truth about the conventional 
reality, whereas ultimate truths are truths about ultimate reality. 
To hold both T(B) and ¬T(B) is being grounded in duality, 
which has to be overcome on the way to enlightenment. But 
we have to be aware that, for Jízàng, T(B) and ¬T(B) is not 
a metaphysical duality, as they both correspond to different 
metaphysical realms. This would come down to saying that “car 
A is red” and “car B is blue” is a duality, where it is clearly 
not. The conjunction of both, thus, is a worldly truth, as thought 
and language (in which this duality is formulated in) is part 
of only one realm, the conventional realm. It is thus dualistic 
thinking that  is conventionally false, and ultimately not-false. 
This dualistic thinking, as part of the Buddhist practice, has to be 
overcome. The gist of Jízàng’s treaties, then, is that overcoming 
dualities is seeking enlightenment, and enlightenment is the 
state of non-duality21. In other words: the duality does not rest in 
the world, but in the (cognitive) apprehension of it. It is Jízàng 
who hints at it, and Zen Buddhism (with which we will later be 
concerned with) that makes it explicit. 
From a semantic point of view, since we are now evaluating 
the status of the statements on the first level of truth, we are 
working on a ‘second’ and higher level of truth (i.e. in a meta-
meta-language), and so I shall introduce a second-level status 
predicate ‘Ʈ’ which semantically works just like T but ranges 
over the first level status-predicates instead of propositions. The 
worldly truth on the second level—Ʈ(T(B) ∧ ¬T(B))— is koti 
21 The problem with language, again, is that non-duality itself refers to a duality 
in that the “non” provokes an opposite concept from which non-duality is 
demarcated, which is duality. It is therefore better to refer to emptiness, rather 
than non-duality.
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(3), which, since ordinary and erroneous can be overcome, just 
like T(B) can be overcome by negating the duality. We establish 
koti (4), which in Jízàng’s framework reads, by negating the 
worldly duality, as follows: ¬Ʈ(T(B) ∧ ¬T(B)) .
2nd Level of Truth  Ʈ(T(B) ∧ ¬T(B)) ¬Ʈ((T(B) ∧ ¬T(B)))
1st Level of Truth T(B) ¬T(B)
Ordinary Truth Absolute Truth
The Sānlùn Catuṣkoṭi
Moving this schema into a vertical position, we see the four 
corners of the catuṣkoṭi before us: 
The Sānlùn catuṣkoṭi
(1)     T(B)
(2)     ¬T(B)
(3)     T(T(B) ∧ ¬T(B)) 
(4)     ¬T((T(B) ∧ ¬T(B)))
Each koti is established by a recursive method of conjoining 
ordinary and absolute truth on the nearest lower level to yield the 
ordinary truth on the higher level and negating the ordinary truth 
in the same level to yield the absolute truth. 
Yet again, the systematic thinker will recognize that Ʈ(T(B) ∧ 
¬T(B)) and ¬Ʈ(T(B) ∧ ¬T(B)) are dualities, which, so the Buddhist 
doctrine, shall be overcome. Jízàng noticed this himself and opts 
for an again higher level, intended to overcome the duality between 
duality and non-duality. But does that help? At every level of truth, 
we return to a higher-level duality which contradicts the Buddhist 
doctrine of non-duality, and so on ad infinitum22… The production 
of new levels of truth will never come to a halt. 
22 This has also been recognised by Chan, ibid.
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Let the following be a schematic model of the recursion,23 
where Cx stands for conventional truth, Ux for ultimate truth, 
the x for the respective truth-level, > for the step from one 
conventional to ultimate truth “horizontally” on one level to the 
other via negation, and » for the “vertical” transgression to the 
next higher truth-level. I call this a truth-transfer (TT).
TT: C0>U0 » C1>U1 »…Cn>Un »…
It is interesting to see that TT, without being explicit on its 
potentially infinite nature, can already be found in the MMK, 
also in verse 18:8, where Nāgārjuna affirms all four alternatives: 
“All is so, or all is not so, both so and not so, neither so nor not 
so. This is the Buddha’s teaching.”
As Westerhoff points out, the commentarial literature on this 
verse, especially Candrakirti, interprets this verse as referring 
to the graded nature of the Buddha’s teachings (anusasana)24. 
Candrakirti’s comments reflect the idea that “all is so” is taught to 
ordinary disciples, “all is not so” to those while informing then about 
the doctrines of momentariness and impermanence, and so on.
Returning to the main threat of the analysis of Jizang: what 
shall we make of this now, knowing that the four corners of 
the catuṣkoṭi are just the beginning of an infinite and never 
terminating process of overcoming non-duality? In Garfield 
(2015) and Fox (1995) we find some noteworthy comments on 
Jízàng’s levels of truth, and the observation that genuine non-
duality can never be found:
This is why I claim that either of your two truths, i.e., interdependent 
nature and discriminative nature; or two truth that is not two, or firmly-
establish truth on the one hand, and ‘Non-two and Non-non-two’; i.e., three 
non-nature or non-firmly-established truth on the other hand, is merely my 
conventional truth, whereas ‘Forgetfulness of words and annihilation of 
thoughts’ is really ultimate truth.25 
23 Not a mathematical model of the recursion, of course.
24 Jan Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka. 89.
25 Jay Garfield, Engaging Buddhism. Why It Matters to Philosophy (Oxford: 
University Press, 2015), 257.
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Yet, there is also Fox elaborating on Jízàng, establishing that, 
apparently on the fourth level,
… all of these distinctions (on the lower three truth levels) are deemed 
conventional, and the authentic discourse regards that any point of view 
cannot be said to be ultimately true, and is useful only so far as it is 
corrective in the above sense.26 
A sudden stop of the recursion at whatever level, however, 
seems arbitrary, and unsupported by the other texts of Jízàng, 
so, let us not take the third or fourth level to have any significant 
role. Let us call genuine non-duality (forgetfulness of words and 
annihilation of thoughts), or rather the experience or insight into 
it; . Jízàng, as the sources above suggest, gives no precise answer 
as to when insight into  is achieved (i.e. how many levels of 
truth have to be crossed)—sometimes its three, and sometimes 
four—but let us assume that after n-progressions through higher 
and higher truth-levels, insight into  can be achieved. We can add 
it to our model in the following way:






2nd Level of Truth Ʈ(T(B) & ¬T(B)) ¬Ʈ((T(B) & ¬T(B)))
1st Level of Truth T(B) ¬T(B)
Ordinary Truth Absolute Truth
TT(N): C0>U0 » C1>U1 » …Cn>Un »…
The Bóxiè Xiànzhēn
In a way, then, the recursion’s cul-de-sac, the soteriological 
“end-goal” is external to the catuṣkoṭi, as there is no bridge of 
logical necessity between the recursion (everything that happens 
before N and ‘N’ itself. This supports the argument that the 
26 Allen Fox, Jizang (New York: Harper Collins), 87.
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catuṣkoṭi is more than a merely argumentative framework to 
refute philosophical enemies but a schema of the (Bodhisattva’s, 
or Arhat’s) path to the soteriological “end-goal,” while it is 
also coherent with the idea that the catuṣkoṭi does not defend 
any position on its own. One could say that what the (positive) 
catuṣkoṭi is (implicitly) defending is the Buddhist doctrine of 
non-duality, although the defence never fully terminates: each 
level of truth, then, is upāya for the nearest upper level of truth, 
which again is upāya for the nearest upper level of truth—
genuine non-duality, via this process, can never be achieved. So, 
the catuṣkoṭi doesn’t defend a position on its own. It is, if we 
believe Rogacz (2015), Jízàng who disagrees:
This pragmatical approach (the levels of truth) provides us to the 
central concept of “refutation of erroneous views as the illumination of 
right views,” bóxiè xiànzhēn (驳谢现真), which was enunciated in the 
“Profound Meaning of the three Treatises.” As we remember, Prāsan ̇gikas 
claimed that Mādhyamaka is only a negative method of refuting views, 
but Sva ̄tantrikas believed that it has also its own, undoubted view. 
Although Jízàng cannot have been a witness of this dispute, he subverted 
the salience of this argument: refutation of erroneous views is always the 
illumination of right views, and vice versa. All beliefs are empty because 
they depend on their rejections. Two opposite beliefs (statements) share 
the same premises and the horizon of possible continuations. Tetralemma 
is transcending these artificial oppositions, such as nothingness/absolute, 
false/truth, samsara/nirvana, and so on. … In this perspective, the doctrine 
of emptiness seems to be the reinterpretation of the doctrine of expedient 
(skr. upāya, ch. fāngbiàn, 方便) means.27
We have now discovered that the role of the catuṣkoṭi in 
Buddhist philosophy exceeds its usage as a purely argumentative 
tool. We have also witnessed how the catuṣkoṭi has lost its 
distinctive four-valued form. We don’t find the distinction into 
positive and negative catuṣkoṭi in Jízàng anymore. In a sense, 
they have melted into one. We also don’t call it the catuṣkoṭi 
anymore, but bóxiè xiànzhēn: the concept of the “refutation of 
erroneous views as the illumination of right views,” (Ch. 驳谢
27 Dawin Rogacz, Knowledge and Truth in the Thought of Jizang, (The Polish 
Journal of the Arts and Culture, 2015), 232.
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现真, Eng. Refute the Truth). What is not clear now, however, 
is whether the bóxiè xiànzhēn (i.e. the catuṣkoṭi) is defending a 
position on its own, or not. 
On the one hand, we have the formalization which strongly 
suggests that the bóxiè xiànzhēn does not, in fact cannot, defend 
a position on its own. On the other hand, we have Rogacz’s 
interpretation of Jízàng, according to which Jízàng’s takes the 
bóxiè xiànzhēn to defend a position on its own. I shall put forward 
a different interpretation of Jízàng’s comments and argue against 
Rogacz.
For Jízàng, as the title of his essay suggests, the bóxiè xiànzhēn 
is not only intended to refute other philosophical positions, 
but also for an illumination of the right view. For Rogacz’s 
interpretation of Jízàng, the recursion (i.e. the refutation of all 
possibilities) is equivalent to . (i.e. “the right view”) Hence, not 
defending any possibility is defending . But how can this be right 
as there is no logical inference from the first position  to , at all? If 
the logical apparatus is right, the bóxiè xiànzhēn does not defend 
a position on its own, as there is no logical connection between 
the kotis and , whatsoever. We are desperately searching for an 
argument in either direction in Jízàng’s work. We can approach 
this problem with considerations on upāya.
The bóxiè xiànzhēn understood as upāya alleviates the problem. 
The idea is simple: a means must not ultimately terminate in a 
goal, and might only be but one of many means necessary to 
reach a goal. In other words: a means doesn’t have to be on its 
own sufficient to reach a goal, and so the recursion that is the 
“refutation of erroneous views” might be necessary, but doesn’t 
have to be, on its own, sufficient for “the illumination of right 
views.” From the viewpoint of upāya, for  (i.e. “the illumination 
of right views) to be brought about, the “refutation of erroneous 
views” has to be brought about, yet the “refutation of erroneous 
views” is on its own not enough to bring about . It is then wrong 
to think of the “as” in the “refutation of erroneous views as the 
illumination of right views” in terms of logical equivalence. 
Rogacz’s use of the term “vice versa” is clearly misleading. It is 
the “illumination of right views” which is always the “refutation 
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of erroneous views,” but not vice versa. Hence, the bóxiè 
xiànzhēn does not defend a position on its own, neither did its 
predecessor, the catuṣkoṭi.
The Paradox
The problems do not end here. The right view for Jízàng is that 
of the middle way between dualities, inherited from Nāgārjuna, 
which we express with. He also writes that attachment to the 
doctrine of emptiness  is misguided, hence it should be overcome.
It is like water able to extinguish the fire, if the water itself could ignite, 
what would be used to extinguish it? Nihilism and eternalism are like fire 
and emptiness can extinguish them. But if someone insists on adherence to 
emptiness, there is no cure which could help him.28 
This comment is paradoxical only if we were thinking that the 
bóxiè xiànzhēn terminates in , and does not go on, as expressed 
in TT(). What the comment suggests, though, is that  , although 
it represents some kind of qualitative change, does not force 
the bóxiè xiànzhēn to a halt, as ascribing  to all things is one-
sided and doctrinal, and thus needs to be overcome29. One could 
argue in the following way: ‘N’ is the soteriological end-goal of 
Buddhist practice with which upāya (i.e. an ongoing refutation 
of erroneous views), prima facie, seems to become redundant—
most means to reach a goal seem to be useless, once the goal is 
reached. The existence of a car, for examples, loses its immediate 
significance once the destination is reached. Thinking about 
having to find a parking place, we see that a means can even 
become obstructive. As soon as it has satisfied its immediate 
purposes, it loses its value. 
28 Huseh-Li Cheng, Empty Logic: Madhyamaka Buddhism from Chinese 
Sources (Motilal Banarsidass, 1991), 49.
29 The relates to footnote (14). Yet, the argument here is slightly different: 
Whereas the linguistics of non-duality provokes a duality, ascribing emptiness 
(and only this) to a phenomenon is one-sided, regardless of whether there is 
a dual or not. This one-sidedness is doctrinal and therefore to be rejected.
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So here is a problem: ‘N’ both does, and does not bring the 
bóxiè xiànzhēn to a halt. We either have,
TT(N): C0>U0 » C1>U1 » …Cn>Un » …N
where  brings the recursion to a halt. Or we have,
TT(N)*: C0>U0 » C1>U1 »N » … Cn>Un » …
where the recursion does not halt. According to Jízàng (he 
has no stance on that), either is a viable option. To dissolve 
this looming paradox, let us now follow the development of 
Buddhism (and with it the catuṣkoṭi) further to the East. 
Towards Kaku-an Shi-en
Jízàng is at the same time the greatest and the last philosopher of 
the Sānlùn school. Yet, the development of Mahayana Buddhism 
did not stop, and with it, the development of the catuṣkoṭi did 
not either. I shall put forward the idea that what is known as a 
Kōan in the Chan/Zen tradition bears so many similarities to the 
catuṣkoṭi that it is hard not to recognize a systematic connection. 
The situation in which Jízàng has left us is, from the perspective 
of Zen, no longer paradoxical, as I shall attempt to illustrate. 
The Kōan
A monk asks: 
“Does a dog have Buddha-nature?”
The Zen Teacher says: 
“Mu”
Wúmén Guān: (1)
We now find ourselves in the teachings of Chan/Zen Buddhism. 
What to make of this little dialog is difficult to say. The answer is 
baffling, and, at first sight, sense cannot be made of it. The Zen 
Teacher’sanswer is “Mu” (Jap. 無), which translates as “nothing-
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(ness).”30  The answer turns into something intelligible, only if 
we think a little more carefully about question. The question, in 
fact, goes wrong in two ways.
First, it is the Nirvanasutra that explicitly states that all sentient 
beings have Buddha-nature, it is their fundamental nature, so a 
dog has Buddha-nature, too. The monk, we can guess, should 
have known this. It is the question, now, that seems to be ill-
posed and based on an inadequate concept of being. But this is 
not the reason for the teacher’s enigmatic answer. So, what is 
the answer supposed to tell us? The question, as it is posed, is 
supposed to be answered with an affirmation-negation linguistic 
device, i.e. simply with “yes” or “no.” But the latter presupposes 
that the question is well-formed, which, taking into account the 
metaphysics of being in Mahayana Buddhism - of which Zen, in 
which context the question is posed, is a branch—it is not. But 
how then, does the answer refer to the ill-posed nature of the 
question? 
Let me try a different approach: The above, Wúmén Guān: (1), 
is known as “Joshu’s Dog” (Ch. 趙州狗子), and often ridiculed 
in popular culture. Just like Wúmén Guān: (18), it is a Kōan 
(Jp. 公案). Kōans feature heavily in the teaching and practice 
of Zen Buddhism. The aim of grappling with, and meditating 
over a Kōan is to overcome conceptual thinking—exactly the 
thinking that has instigated the monk’s question. Therefore, 
it is not the monk’s ignorance of the fact that, according to 
Mahayana tradition, every sentient being has Buddha-nature, 
but his conceptual thinking which manifests itself in a yes/no-
dichotomy, in which a concept either applies or does not apply. 
The Kōan practice (grappling with Joshu’s Dog for example) is 
intended to overcome conceptual thinking, not to teach doctrines, 
such as that of Buddha-nature. Now, I argue, it is the dichotomy 
in conceptual thinking that the Zen teacher’s answer is pointing 
at, as a hint for the monk to question his thought process (not 
necessarily his knowledge of the sutras). 
30 Chao-chou Ts’ung-shen (Jap. Joshu) is the teacher referred to.
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Abbreviated Catuṣkoṭis
A possible answer to “Joshu’s Dog” could be stated as a 
negative catuṣkoṭi. The act of denying all kotis comes down to 
denying all possible ways a dog could or could not have Buddha 
nature. As the case of Buddha-nature is certainly an exceptional 
case, let us rethink the Kōan in a Nāgārjunian manner. 
In the context of the MMK, the Kōan would have been stated 
as: “does a dog have svabhāva?” The Nāgārjunian answer, which 
we are already familiar with, is a denial qua negative catuṣkoṭi 
of all the possible ways a dog could have svabhāva. Ultimately, 
the dog’s nature is śu ̄nyata (emptiness), Nāgārjuna would say. 
It is not a big conceptual leap from ‘emptiness’ (śu ̄nya, Skt. 
शून्यता) to ‘nothing-ness’ (Mu, Ch. 無). In effect, both Nāgārjuna’s 
and Joshu’s answer to the monk’s question are, conceptually, 
equivalent31. It is only that Nāgārjuna gives a profound logical 
apparatus with which all the possible ways a dog could have 
own-being, i.e., svabhāva, is denied. It is this logico-ontological 
apparatus in the background that has vanished from the Zen 
tradition, but given the historical connection, we can assume that 
it still resonates somewhere among other implicit principles that 
have been inherited from India. I shall, therefore, put forward the 
thesis that the Kōan is an abbreviated catuṣkoṭi. 
Identifying the Kōan with upāya is not as reckless as my 
initial thesis that the catuṣkoṭi should be considered upāya, as 
it is widely agreed that the Kōan’s role in Chan/Zen is that of 
a meditational object. We have the Rinzai school of Zen which 
focusses heavily on the Kōan as a means to gain enlightenment 
(Jap. satori). Zen, furthermore, makes a distinction regarding 
how enlightenment occurs. According to the Sōtō school, 
31 I have to mitigate this parallelism: whereas the Indian Buddhist’s an-atman 
(no own being) and Nāgārjuna’s sunyata (emptiness) are epistemological 
concepts—referring to the fact that things are only forms (as superimpositions), 
“Asian nothingness” (tōyōteki mu),” referring to the Kyoto School’s concept 
of nothingness through satori (and therefore the intellectualisation of Zen), 
refers to a lived experience of reality as a way arising naturally out of 
nothingness, and should therefore rather be considered a pragmatic concept.
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enlightenment comes gradually, sometimes glossed at as “silent 
enlightenment,” as it is seen as a process of discovery through 
Zazen (sitting meditation). On the other hand, we have the Rinzai 
school which advocates “sudden enlightenment.” The Kōan and 
Zazen, both are a means of reaching satori. Hence, satori is for 
Zen what we have, so far, referred to as ‘N’.
We have now gone the full circle to support the main hypothesis 
of this essay: 
Catuṣkoṭi and Kōan play the same role in Buddhist philosophy and 
share a systematic structure. Both are to be considered a schema for upāya 
- means to the soteriological “end-goal,” which is enlightenment.
Although I cannot claim that the verification of my hypothesis 
is airtight (it lacks a lot of historical exegesis), I still hope that 
it makes sense on the grounds of the material provided. The 
similarities and practical use of concepts (Kōan and catuṣkoṭi) is 
too apparent not to draw this connection.
That Kōan and catuṣkoṭi share a systematic structure still 
needs to be elicited. We have left Jízàng with the paradox that 
both terminates and does not terminate the upāya, and I have 
promised a dissolving of this paradox in the Zen tradition, so 
the next section shall model the remainder of the catuṣkoṭi, once 
it reached Japan. For this, I shall consult another staple of the 
Zen tradition: the jūgyūzu. It is here that the schematic structure 
which is missing in the Kōan is made overt.
The Zen catuṣkoṭi (aka. the Jūgyūzu)
In fact, what is left over of the catuṣkoṭi in the Zen tradition is 
perhaps too sparse for it to still be an instance of the catuṣkoṭi. 
in any case, it is drastically abbreviated. It is merely the very 
scaffold of the bóxiè xiànzhēn that has found its way into Zen 
literature in the form of ten pictures of a man and an ox and 
their corresponding verses: the jūgyūzu (Jp. 十牛図, Eng. Ten 
Ox Herding Pictures). 
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The pictures and verses of the jūgyūzu above, as it is widely 
conceded recognized, are similes of the path to enlightenment, 
with the ox as a symbol for meditation (Kōan or Zazen) practice. 
The ox is actually ubiquitous in Buddhist literature. It features 
in texts as early as the Maha Gopalaka Sutra as a symbol for 
meditation (perhaps because wrestling with one’s mind is 
as strenuous as wrestling with an ox), and is one of the many 
iconographics that has survived the Mahayana’s journey from 
India to the East. According to D. T. Suzuki (unpublished), the 
Oxherding pictures and verse made their first appearance in 
China around the 12th century. The most well-known version of 
the jūgyūzu is the one by the Chinese Chan master Kaku-an Shi-
en (Ch. 廓庵師遠), who was also the first to contribute verse to 
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It is also with Kaku-an Shi-en that the Ox Herding becomes 
a jūgyūzu (jū, Jp. 十, Eng. ten), instead of a hachigyūzu (hachi, 
Jp. 八; Eng. eight). It is the blank space at which the hachigyūzu 
halts, whereas the jūgyūzu incorporates two further pictures. 
This detail is of outmost significance for our ongoing discussion. 
To see the relations and the similarities between bóxiè xiànzhēn 
and jūgyūzu, we need to know the meaning behind the pictures, 
and we need to refer back to the recursive schema (TT), which is 
the scaffold of the bóxiè xiànzhēn. 
To remind you, the reader, of (TT), here is the schema again:






2nd Level of Truth Ʈ(T(B) & ¬T(B)) ¬Ʈ((T(B) & ¬T(B)))
1st Level of Truth T(B) ¬T(B)
Ordinary Truth Absolute Truth
TT(N): C0>U0 » C1>U1 » …Cn>Un »…N
Also, we haven’t settled whether (TT) is the correct analysis, 
or whether (TT*) is what the bóxiè xiànzhēn expresses.
TT(N)*: C0>U0 » C1>U1 » N » … Cn>Un » …
The jūgyūzu depicts a character, a boy in the case above, and 
his search and taming of an ox as a metaphor for on his path to, 
and through, enlightenment. So, it already suggests that there is 
a post-enlightenment state, such as TT(N)* describes it.  
In the first picture, we meet him alone in the wilderness, lost 
and confused, but searching. He knows about the conventional 
truths and is unsatisfied with them, it is interpreted. Let this 
conventional belief be T(B), and his stage on the way towards 
enlightenment be represented by C0. 
The boy goes on and finds the traces of the ox in picture three 
and four, which serve as a metaphor for finding the sutras and 
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inquiring into the Buddhist doctrines. He then learns about the 
erroneous nature of conventional truth and, for the first time, 
has a glimpse of the ultimate truth, ¬T(B). Let this stage be 
represented by U0. Here we have the first two kotis, and the first 
level of Jízàng’s truth-hierarchy complete. 
However, the boy is unable to distinguish conventional from 
ultimate truth, and his mind is still confused as to truth and 
falsehood, and so the boy believes in both T(B) & ¬T(B), and 
is yet not ready to discriminate them—this is the third koti. This 
stage, C1, depicts the boy catching and taming the ox in the fourth 
and fifth picture. 
Picture six shows the boy riding the ox. He has successfully 
tamed the beast and is able to let loose the line. He has realised 
that the duality of truth and falsehood needs to be overcome. 
This is stage U1 of Jízàng’s hierarchy and the fourth and final 
koti ¬Ʈ((T(B) & ¬T(B))). As the series continues, the ox has 
disappeared, and the boy is back at home. 
The next picture is an empty circle, which I shall represent 
as ‘N’. It’s the manifestation of an ineffable reality which is 
beyond the dualities of language and thought. This is where, for 
the boy, the illusion of self has vanished, and he experiences 
non-duality. Hence not only ox, as it is now useless (as the 
discussion on what it means to be a means as already revealed; 
meditation is a means and not in itself sufficient, yet necessary 
for enlightenment32), but also the boy, is gone. This represents 
enlightenment. This is where the hachigyūzu ends. The boy has 
found enlightenment, and the ox, which is a metaphor for the 
boy’s upāya, like Wittgenstein’s ladder, has become redundant. 
Let the hachigyūzu (OX8) be represented by this schema, which 
shall remind us of the bóxiè xiànzhēn in its TT(N)-reading: 
OX8: C
0 » U0 » C1 » U1 »
32 Some traditions of Zen would even reject that. Formal Meditation, such as 
Zazen, might not be necessary, enlightenment can come unexpected. But 
even if formal meditation is not required, some kind of quasi-meditative 
process is involved.
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This has been the first option of two readings of the bóxiè 
xiànzhēn, which has led us to a paradox in Jízàng for which we 
couldn’t find a solution within his own canon. If the hachigyūzu 
is a successor of the bóxiè xiànzhēn, the process is supposed to 
terminate with reaching enlightenment, and the recursion has 
become obsolete. However, the jūgyūzu above includes two 
further pictures after the enlightenment. What to make of those?
The ninth picture shows a serene landscape with the boy still gone. 
We can interpret it as a return to the ordinary world, which, although 
the boy has found enlightenment, has not vanished. The boy, too, 
has not vanished either. He returns to the world in the last picture of 
the jūgyūzu. It hence appears as though the journey continues, and 
as with Jízàng’s hierarchy,  has not brought the process to a halt. 
The jūgyūzu and the hachigyūzu seem to contradict themselves 
in that in the latter  is the end of the series, whereas in the former 
it is not. But to think in this way is to overlook a significant detail 
in the iconography: the ox is still missing, and upāya has become 
pointless after enlightenment. Although the boy has returned to the 
ordinary, he has not returned to a pre-enlightened state which would 
again necessitate and overcoming of dualistic thinking and thereby, 
analogously, keep the recursion going. For the boy, the illusion of 
a self and that of a world with svabhāva (to serve the Nargarjunian 
term) has vanished, and conventional reality is seen as what it 
is—a conceptual superimposition on ultimate reality. The jūgyūzu 
(OX10) shall hence be represented in the following way, where 
the superscript ‘C’ represents the post-enlightened perspective on 
conventional reality, knowing that the states-of-affairs in C are 
merely conceptual impositions on ultimate reality N:
OX10: C
0 » U0 » C1 » U1 » » CN
It is important to note that the process does not stop with 
CN, but it is the post-enlightened state CN in which the boy will 
remain throughout his post-enlightened life33. What a lucky boy.
33 In fact, several comments of Hakuin suggest that experiences of enlightenment 
can be had over and over again, and only through ongoing practice, the post-
enlightened state could be maintained and cultivated. This would question the 
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Solving Jízàng’s Paradox
Jízàng’s paradox can now be resolved if we take the distinction 
into pre- and post-enlightened states into account. In both cases 
of the bóxiè xiànzhēn (TT(N) and TT(N)*) the recursion stops, it 
is only in the latter that the post-enlightened state is added. With 
this in the background, we now know how to interpret Jízàng’s 
comment that a dogmatic belief in  is erroneous and has to be 
overcome. Not by applying the recursive method of the bóxiè 
xiànzhēn to , but by returning to the starting point with a post-
enlightened perspective. A famous Chan/Zen saying articulates 
this thought:
Thirty years ago, before I practiced Chan, I saw that mountains are 
mountains and rivers are rivers. However, after having achieved intimate 
knowledge and having gotten a way in, I saw that mountains are not 
mountains and rivers are not rivers. But now that I have found rest, as 
before, I see mountains are mountains and rivers are rivers.34
Here, talk of the mind being still and at peace in Nāgārjuna 
(MMK dedication and 25.24) is also worth mentioning35.  For 
Nāgārjuna, compulsive philosophical questioning (such as asking 
questions in form of the four corners) would be stopped when 
the mind stops grasping at philosophical theories and simply 
accepts those as conventional. Nāgārjuna calls this prapañca 
upaśama (Eng, “pacification (upaśama) of mental proliferations 
(prapañca)”36). Hence, the idea of quietening the mind of 
philosophical questioning is integrated in Madhyamaka thought. 
Candrakīrti commented on it in the Prasannapadā, saying that 
complete repudiation of upāya. Still, one could guess that post-enlightened 
upāya is different from pre-enlightened upāya, which in consequence would 
not question the account given above.
34 Urs App, Master Yunmen: From the Record of the Chan Teacher Gate of the 
Clouds (New York: Kodansha International Press), 1994.
35 Thanks to an anonymous referee for making me aware that we can return to 
Nāgārjuna at this point.
36 Thanks go to Jan Westerhoff for this translation.
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For the Nobles when they see dependent-arising as it really is, that 
very dependent-arising is called “the calming of manifoldness (prapañca 
upaśama)—in the sense that there is the calming of instances of 
manifoldness in it. And because (it) is entirely without the misfortunes 
of birth, old age, death and so forth owing to the ceasing of (any) dealing 
with (the dichotomies): cognition and cognizables in view (of the fact) that 
mind and mental factors do not arise in it, it is (ultimate) welfare.37 
The leap from Nāgārjuna to Candrakīrti to Zen is a minute one. 
Conclusion
In seeking a comprehensive account of the catuṣkoṭi, this 
paper has been working on logical, ontological, historical, 
and soteriological aspects in unison. The fact that the logical 
aspects of the catuṣkoṭi have been unhinged from their 
ontological fundament has prevented any fruitful modelling 
and obstructed further insight into the historical development 
of this fascinating piece of Buddhist philosophy. I hope that 
with this study of the development of Madhyamaka thought 
and with the help of the formal modelling applied thought 
the paper it is now clearer what the catuṣkoṭi is, and how it 
functions in the Buddhist canon. As the confluence of the 
last chapters suggests, we should not consider the catuṣkoṭi 
as exclusively a phenomenon of Madhyamaka thought, but 
think of the Madhyamaka’s catuṣkoṭi as an instance of a much 
broader category, which is a schema of, and for, upāya, which 
includes the bóxiè xiànzhe and the jūgyūzu (and perhaps many, 
yet unexplored others).
37 Compare, Anne McDonald, In Clear Words. The Prasannapada, Chapter One, 
Volume Two (Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften), 
2015.
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